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IN Tl II. UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Ii7> I KICIA L.DAYTON,
riaintni/Appellant

DOUGLAS 1

CaseNo.20010889-CA

*TON

i Xlendani Appellee

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appea: -p*n * / I T K I I I and decree of divorce. Second Disttki * '""it
Judge iio^er S. *>ULSOI* uiiw.'iu *. is

-

78. 200.

Conclusions of Law is u- \ddendum \

.

. , 7 oi the findings oil acts and

' : i ourt has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

CodeAnn. §78-2a-3(h)(l< >9 6] ,
SIArKMICNI OF 11 • li: ISSUES AND SI ANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues,
I. 'Whether the trial court, inappropriately set aside a mutually assented to, on the
record sdlltim/til ugivuncnl iqtiitll),' ill"", iilmi1 111* iii.iiiliil ussrls IHIVMTH (lir ^ppHliinl
imd the Appellee? The decision of a trial court to enforce a settlement agreement will not
be reversed on anneal ti.il* s^ " ^ hown that there was an abuse of discretion.
Goodmansen v. Libt

,

1 Wl).

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the Dayton marital
estate awarding 91% of the marital assets to the Appellee and 9 % to the Appellant? The
standard of review for evaluating a trial court's property valuation and division [in a
divorce proceeding] is when such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman. 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (quoting Noble v. Noble,
761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)).
3. Whether the trial court unlawfully punished the Appellant for her inaccurate
testimony by not dividing the marital assets equitably between the parties, awarding 91%
of the marital assets to the Appellee? A question of law is reviewed under a correction of
error standard, giving no deference to the trial court's determination. Liska v. Liska. 902
P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995)
4. Whether the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were so
inadequate as to not permit appellate review. "Findings are adequate only if they are
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah App. 1993)(quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988)).
5. Whether the trial court should have awarded the Appellant attorney's fees given
her financial need, the Appellee's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fee. "The decision to award attorneys fees rests in the sound discretion of the court and
will only be disturbed for abuse of discretion." Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947
(Utah App. 1998).
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STATEMENT O F IHE CASE
P u t i n Ui I, I l«i) (nil 11 it |il.nnlill ill III! Il ] i i i i nil ml llii Apprll.'inl hefniv litis
C o u r t will hereinafter be referred to as the Appellant. Douglas D. Dayton the ^._ _ ant
in the lower court; and the Appellee in this case will here in after be referred to as the
.'-. .••'umesoi the transcupl w i n picpaiul in llus IMSC. HII1 llrsl > i Iliiiiiii

Appel.v*.

the first day of trial held on January the 4, 2001 and hereinafter
will be referred to as (Jan. K

f

he second volume i on\ tins the transcript of tht Iri I

proceedings belli . - i<.biudi> *-*».. *

. ebiudn .;-

\-\; ^ • ..
!

Petition I
^ee Addendum J. A three da> trial, regarding the di\ orce, started Jar

nnc ^4„ ! 9 9 9 .

4. 20i»1 J a n .

K II) The two subsequent days of litigation took place on February 26, J1101 „ ai id
I cbruarj /'"K, J'lllll

(I I. I I, M.

Appellee made an on the record selti V^iiii<iii

• I i>,l ,lr, I (nil Vnpc: 11,*,i, 1 i I
u.£^i v v i i i w i l l

regarding the distribution of the

n Mil ital estate, leaving the issues of alimony and child support: to be litigated at a futi ire
.1 1. 111 i. I!

11} \( (In Mail ill the s u i w d Li) i»l ln.il «»n I . I1" r * "'f".

"N I (I,

^ ppellee brought up the issi le as tc whether or not the January 4 JOOi on the record
s zt tlement agreement was binding (Feb. R. 2) The trial court: concluded the settlement
« ^ ^ ^ e n t was not binding, (I -eb. R. 8,12)
1

1 lllliii, niiiin li is in in ni Il liiiill nl I i' 11 in ni J i ii'i, 'K "Midi, the trial ; mil in r Il-, llic mailer under

MW.^W^WX.

and thereafter issued a Ruling and Temporary Order on March 23, 2001, On

\ ' II ?6. ^001 the Appellant filed a Motion To Alter or .Amend Judgment. See,
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Addendum G. On August 22, 2001 the trial court denied the motion without giving any
reasons for it's decision. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Divorce
Decree were entered on September 28, 2001. See Addendum A. An appeal filed by the
Appellant on November 5, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellant and Appellee were married on June 5, 1982. See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P.2) During their eighteen year marriage Appellant and Appellee
worked in the family concrete business. (Feb. R. 198-199)
2. During the marriage, the Appellant and Appellee used the incomefromthe
family concrete business to provide for their family which included two teen-age sons.
(Feb. R. 197) The Appellant and Appelleefiledjoint tax returns which included the
assets from their family business. The parties did not file a separate tax return for the
business. (Feb. R. 199). As a result of working in the family concrete business the
Appellant and Appellee accumulated substantial assets. See Addendum A. (Findings of
Fact P. 10)
3. The Appellant and Appellee separated in June of 1999. (Jan. R. 91, 188).
4. An Order on Order To Show Cause issued by the trial court on January 25,
2000 required the Appellee to continue to make payments on the family bills including
the house payment, utilities payments, and car payments for both the Appellant and the
parties son. See Addendum L. An Order on Objection sign by the trial judge on March
17, 2002 required the Appellee to bring house payments, utilities and the car payments
4

current within 15 day or to begin paying the Appellant $2,500 per month beginning the
month of March 2000. See Addendum K. The court in an order to show cause hearing
which was held on April 14, 2000 found the Appellee in contempt for failing to comply
with previous court orders and sentence the Appellee to serve five days in the county jail.
The Appellee was allowed to purge himself of contempt by paying $5,000 before April
25, 2000. That order also restrained both parties from disposal of any of their assets
without the prior written approval of the other party or a court order. See Addendum M.
5. During the first day of trial, Appellant presented evidence of marital assets and
liabilities through accountant, and expert witness, Roger Nuttle. (Feb. R. 1) Mr. Nuttle
prepared Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, which comprised an accounting of the parties marital
estate. (Jan. R. 10-11). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was entered into as evidence. (Jan. R. 67).
Although this document was not completely un-controverted by the testimony of the
Appellee, it was used by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(Findings of Fact P. 11, 17-18).
6. The trial court also received testimony from the Appellant regarding her
involvement in the dissipation of marital assets, namely some cement forms and a
backhoe tractor that were located on the family property. (Jan. R. 244). The Appellant
testified that she did not have any knowledge as to what happened to the backhoe. That it
was removed from the property in March of 2000 when she was in California. (Jan. R.
244). The Appellant also testified that her sons had taken some of the wood concrete
forms located on the family property and brought them into the house to be burnt as fire
5

wood when the furnace was broken. (Jan. R. 247).
7. Near the end of the first day of trial on January 4, 2001, Appellant and
Appellee made an on the record settlement agreement regarding the distribution of the
marital estate, leaving the issues of alimony and child support to be litigated at a future
date. (Jan. R. 250). The settlement agreement was the Appellant would receive a three
acre parcel of land (part of the marital estate) valued at approximately $60,000 dollars
free and clear of any obligation secured by the property and a $25,000 lump sum
payment. The Appellee would get all other marital property including the house, boat,
sand rails (cars) and concrete business equipment. (Jan. R. 250). The trial court
suggested that the stipulation be subject to both parties accounting for the properties that
had been disposed of after the parties separation. (Jan. R. 237-238)8 The Appellant
made it clear that this was a take it or leave it offer, and it was not to be conditioned
whatsoever. (Jan. R. 249-50). The Appellee represented on the record that he agreed to
the settlement agreement. (Jan. R. 250).
8. At the beginning of the second day of trial on February 26, 2001 the Appellee
brought up the issue as to whether or not the on the record settlement agreement, assented
to by the Appellant and the Appellee on January 4, 2001, was binding because the
appellant had disposed of the backhoe. (Feb. R.2) The trial court, over the objection of
the Appellant, concluded the settlement agreement was not binding but gave no reason for
its decision. (Feb. R. 8, 12)
9. During trial on February 26, 2001 the Appellant testified that at the time of the
6

first hearing she had an idea as to what happened to the backhoe, but that she was not
sure because she did not want to ask a certain person that question. (Feb. R.62)
Appellant testified that after the first day of trial she became aware that one of her sons
had sold the backhoe. (Feb. R.64, 244). The parties son Ryan testified that he had sold
the backhoe in March 2000 for approximately $7,000 and used the money to fix up his
truck that was broken and used the rest of money so that the family could survive and so
that the Appellant could pay her attorney's fees. (Feb. R. 244-245). The Appellant also
indicated that she, with the assistant of her son, had sold some metal concrete forms
located on the family property but they had not been removed from the property prior to
the first day of the trial which was in January 2001. (Feb. R.62-63).
10. When the trial court set aside the stipulations of the parties, it encouraged the
parties to engaged in additional negotiations for the purpose of reaching a settlement. In
reference to the backhoe and concrete forms the trial court stated " . . . probably the key is
a question as to values, rather than anything

" (Feb. R. 4) The trial court also stated

that a party may have been lying or not credible about some issues. The trial court than
said " . . . [y]ou know, those aren't the issues: The real issues are when you get right
down to balancing money, those are the things that are probably be the most important.
Where are you going to come out in the end on a monetary basis. If you can set aside the
emotions, and look at it that way maybe there is a way. I don't issue punitive judgements
in divorce cases. I understand how emotional and howfrustratingit is for both sides . . . "
(Feb. R. 6)
7

11. The Appellee's deposition was take on April 7, 2000. In that deposition the
Appellee stated that his construction company consisted solely on equipment he was
leasing and services. He testified that he sold the business to his live-in girl friend
because of the divorce proceedings with the Appellant. (Jan. R 197) The Appellee
initially alleged that his girl friend had paid him $45,000 for the company but then
admitted she had not paid him the $45,000. (Jan. R. 194-197) When asked if her name
was on the business to avoid a division in the divorce proceedings the Appellee answered
"correct". (Jan. R. 197) The Appellee testified that he had sold a Bobcat, a 24' flat bed
trailer, a disco enclosed trailer, a sand rail, a 1994 truck trailer and forms, a 16f trailer and
other items. The money received from these items was retained by the Appellee.
(Deposition. 71-83).
12. In the course of the trial the parties stipulated the home had an appraised
valued at $175,000 and was subject to a first montage of $89,113 and a second montage
in a sum of $45,231 resulting in a equity of $40,656. The parties own three acres of land
which was appraised and the value was stipulated at $60,000 subject to a mortgage sum
of $9,751.00 resulting in a equity of $50,249. The Appellant testified that business
equipment assets, business furniture, and personal property acquired during the marriage
as listed on Appellant's exhibit, (See Addendum B. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) represented a
value of $199,833. The evidence views most favorably to the Appellee would support a
value of $113,733. The only disputed property is the business equipment listed on
Schedule B of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. (See Schedule B Property Evaluation Attached
8

hereto as Addendum D). The indebtedness of the parties not related to the real property
amounted to a total $143,987.
13. The Trial court made no finding of fact as to the value of the assets or the
amount of indebtedness.
14. After the trial, Judge Dutson entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. See Addendum A. In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court
characterized the Appellants trial testimony as 6<the most problematic issue in this case."
(Findings of Fact P. 5). The trial court identifies the Appellant as one who "intentionally
attempted to mislead the [c]ourt... relating primarily to personal property she sold or
disposed of intentionally or that has disappeared while in her possession." See
Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 5) The trial court also indicated that it 46will not
reward the [Appellant] for her deceptions in regards to property she has sold, disposed of
and lied about." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 10)
15. Also included in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law is
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, specifically schedules A, B and C. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is the only
evidence used in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to identify the property
constituting the marital estate. It is also used to describe how to divide the marital assets
and debts. See Addendum B. (Findings of Fact P. 10-11, 17-18) In the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ordered the Appellee to sell a substantial portion
of the marital assets, including the family home, three acres of land, and two sand rails
(cars) and accompanying trailers, in order to pay down the marital debt. See Addendum
9

A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Following the sale of these marital assets, if there
remained any outstanding marital debt, the Appellee was ordered to sell the boat and
motor home to finish paying off all existing marital debt. See Addendum A. (Findings
of Fact P. 11-12, 19) After all the marital debt was paid, the court awarded all surplus
money or listed assets not needed to be sold, to the Appellee. See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P. 12, 19) Additionally, all business related assets listed on schedule A
and B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 were awarded to the Appellee (respondent). See Addendum
A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Moreover, the Appellee was awarded several household
items listed on Schedule C of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact
P. 11,17-18)
16. The trial court awarded the Appellant the remaining house hold furnishings
listed on Schedule C of Plaintiff s Exhibit land a 1995 Mitsubishi vehicle with its
accompanying debt. See Addendum A. (Findings of Facts P. 11, 17)
17. The Order to Show Cause of January 25, 2000 required the parties exchange
financial information. See Addendum L. The subsequent Order to Show Cause of March
17, 2000 required the parties to exchange information including the 1999 financial
records within 15 days. See Addendum M. The Appellant submitted written
interrogatories and requests for production document to the Appellee on November 14,
2000 requiring, among other things, the Appellee's financial records. See Addendum N.
Despite the court's order and the discovery request, the Appellee did not produce his
financial records. The Appellant retained the services of an accountant, Roger Nuttle
10

who produced Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 and Plaintiffs Exhibit4 ( See
Addendums B, H and I)fromrecords the Appellant was able to provide. The Appellee
claimed that he had little or no income to pay indebtedness or to pay child support and
alimony. The court, as a result of the efforts of the Appellant and her accountant, found
that the Appellee's annual income was $70,000-$75,000 per year or approximately
$6,000 per month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 7) The court also found that
information provided by the Appellant that her monthly income was $1,316 dollars per
month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 6) The trial court would not have been
able to determine the Appellee's income or to establish alimony or child support without
the efforts of the Appellant's accountant and attorney.
18. The Appellant during the course of the trial presented evidence as to her
Attorney fees, her income and needs and the Appellee's income. In the trial courts
written decision and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled
that each party had to pay it's own attorney's fees and court costs. See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P. 13) See Addendum O. (Ruling and Temporary Order P. 8) The trial
court made no findings as to why it was denying the Appellant request for attorney fees
and court costs.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court divided the marital assets in a grossly disproportionate manner.
The trial court awarded the Appellee 91% of the marital assets and only 9% to the
Appellant. Such a disparate deviationfromthe presumption of a 50%-50% split of all
11

marital assets upon divorce is an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The trial court inappropriately punished the Appellant when it awarded the
Appellee 91% of the marital assets for Appellants in accurate testimony. Evidence of
such testimony can only be used to discredit Appellant, and thus it goes to the weight of
the Appellants evidence. Inaccurate testimony, or even purposeful deception does not
give the trial court the authority to issue a punitive division of the marital assets.
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law are inadequate for a
proper review. The trial court is required to make specific findings and establish a basis
for it decision regarding the division of marital assets. The trial court's findings did not
include specific values to each of the marital assets. The findings did not indicate what
means it use to determine the value of each award to the parties. The trial courts findings
were insufficient to justify it's division of the marital assets.
The trial court inappropriately set aside an on the record settlement agreement
between the parties. The Appellant offered the exact terms of the agreement while on the
record before the court. The Appellant made it clear that the offer was an unconditioned
'take it or leave it offer." Both parties assented to the settlement agreement on the
record. Subsequently the trial court summarily set the agreement aside giving no legal
bases for it's decision.
The trial court inappropriately did not award the Appellant attorneys fees and
costs. The Appellant was in substantial financial need, and the Appellee was in a
financial position to pay for the Appellant's fees. Additionally, the trial court did not
12

make anyfindingswhatsoever regarding the denial of attorneys as it is obligated to do so.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
SET ASIDE A MUTUALLY ASSENTED TO ON THE RECORD
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EQUALLY DIVIDING THE MARITAL
ASSETS.
At the end of the first day of trial on January 4, 2001, the Appellant and the

Appellee came to a stipulation regarding the division of marital property. The agreement
was that the Appellant would receive the three acre parcel of land free and clear of
encumbrances valued at $60,000 and received a $25,000 lump sum paymentfromthe
Appellee. (Jan. R. 235) The Appellant would receive all other marital property, pay the
debts, and the Appellant would not pursue attorneys fees and accounting fees. (Jan. R.
235)
At the time these terms were presented before the trial court, Judge Dutson
attempted to condition the agreement by requiring that both parties fully disclose all
information regarding the dissipation of assets. (Jan. R. 237) Judge Dutson also
attempted to condition the agreement on both parties protection of the marital assets.
(Jan. R. 237) Finally, Judge Dutson attempted to condition the agreement by requiring
that if any thing was sold it must be accounted for and applied to the stipulation. (Jan. R.
238)
The Appellant then stated before the trial court that it was not agreeing to any of
the conditions j ^aced by Judge Dutson. Counsel for the Appellant stated "[b]ut we did

13

not submit it on the basis that it could still be before the court. We did it on the basis that
the only issue before Your Honor, was the alimony and child support. That was a
specific stipulation." (Jan. R. 242) The Appellant made it clear that this was a take it or
leave it offer, and it was not to be conditioned whatsoever. (Jan. R. 249-50).
Judge Dutson then required the Appellant to testify as to her dissipation of any
marital assets. (Jan. R. 243) Whereupon the Appellant testified that she had not sold any
marital assets. (Jan. R. 244) The Appellant then reiterated that the deal being offered by
the Appellant was the deal as previously stated by counsel, not condition on any other
provision. (Jan. R. 250) Judge Dutson then asked the Appellee and Appellant if they
agreed to this stipulation, and both parties answered "yes> sir." (Jan. R. 250) Judge
Dutson then ordered counsel for the Appellant to prepare the order. (Jan. R. 250)
On February 26, 2001, the second day of trial, the Appellee questioned the trial
court as to whether or not there was a binding settlement agreement. (Feb. R. 2) At that
time, the Appellee proffered to the trial court that he believed that the Appellant had
withheld information regarding the dissipation of marital assets, namely the backhoe
tractor.
The trial court, over the objection of the Appellant, set aside the stipulations of the
parties. (Feb. R. 8) However, immediately prior to setting it aside the trial court
encouraged the parties to engaged in additional negotiations for the purpose of reaching a
settlement. In reference to the backhoe and concrete forms the trial court stated " . . .
probably the key is a question as to values, rather than anything...." (Feb. R. 4) The
14

trial court also stated that a party may have been lying or not credible about some issues.
The trial court than said " . . . [y]ou know, those aren't the issues: The real issues are
when you get right down to balancing money, those are the things that are probably be
the most important. Where are you going to come out in the end on a monetary basis.95
At which point the parties were not able to reach an agreement, and the agreement was
set aside. (Feb. R. 8)
Rule 4-504(7) of the Code of Judicial Administration (2001) allows a trial court to
enter an order based on stipulation if the stipulation was made on the record. It is clear
that at the end of the first day of trial both the Appellant and Appellee assented to the
unconditioned settlement agreement. (Jan. R. 250) At the beginning of the second day of
trial, the trial court set the settlement aside without articulating any legal basis for setting
it aside. The enforceability of a settlement agreement is governed by state contract law.
Brighten Corp. v. Ward. 31 P.3d 594, 598 (Utah App. 2001). As such, it was incumbent
on the moving party, the Appellee, to articulate before the trial court any legal basis to set
aside the settlement. No such legal basis were presented. Rather, the trial court
summarily set the settlement aside based on a proffer by Counsel for the Appellee. This
effectively denied the Appellant any opportunity to argue against any of the potential
legal basis that would justify setting aside an otherwise enforceable settlement.
Moreover, the trial court made nofindingsthat justified his setting aside the settlement
agreement.
Assuming arguendo that his justifications were based on his proposed contingent
15

provision, requiring complete disclosure of any dissipated marital assets, according to
Judge Dutsons own provisions, any non-disclosure would only modify the agreement, or
be applied to the stipulation. It would not be grounds to set the whole settlement aside.
(Jan. R. 238) In this case, the reason the trial court set aside the whole agreement was
due to the alleged non-disclosed sale of a backhoe tractor for $7,000. Thus, at most,
Judge Dutson should have adjusted the settlement agreement by $7,000 in favor of the
Appellee. Without any other legal justification, Judge Dutson did not have the authority
to set aside the entire settlement.
Therefore, this Court should overrule the order of the trial court setting aside the
settlement agreement, and uphold the settlement agreement.
II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DIVIDED THE DAYTON MARITAL ESTATE IN A GROSSLY
DISPROPORTIONATE MANNER.
In Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993), this Court recognized that

4<

trial courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a fair and

systematic fashion." In a divorce action "each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty
percent of the marital property." Id (quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah
App. 1990). The law presumes that marital assets will be shared equally between the
parties. Id.
The Appellant an Appellee were married for eighteen years. During their marriage
the they developed a family concrete business. All of the family and business assets
were co-mingled and subsequently dispensed as needed by the family or by the business.
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It was never intended by either party that there be any distinction between business and
family assets. Both parties used business accounts to benefit the family, and used family
property (or the equity in the family property) to benefit the business.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court utilizes a trial
exhibit, identified as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, to describe the nature of the various marital
assets. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 17). Many of the values attached to
marital assets listed in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 are undisputed by the Appellee. This Court
has upheld the trial courts discretion to base property valuations solely on evidence
presented by one spouse, where the other spouse failed to present contrary evidence.
Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Appellee did present contradictory testimony regarding the value of some of
the of the assets listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See infra. The trial court
did not make any specific findings regarding the value of the various assets in his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Judge Dutson only identified what assets were
to be awarded to each party.
When challenging a trial courts findings of fact, the appellate party must play
"devils advocate" and extract all evidence that purports to support the trial courts
findings. ONEIDA/SLIC v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1053-53 (Utah App. 1994). The appellant must marshal all the evidence that would
support a finding that the division of the marital estate was not disproportionate, "and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support thefindingsin question."
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Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Phillips v. Hatfield,
904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995)).
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court awarded the
Appellant all the household items as listed on Schedule C of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, less
"one big screen television, the ceramic kiln, all the guns and rifles, and camping and
outdoor gear and accessories." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) The
value of the Appellant's awarded household items listed on Schedule C totaled $4,390
and was not contested by the Appellee. See Addendum B. The trial court also awarded
the Appellant "the Mitsubishi automobile, plus the obligation to pay thereon." See
Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 17) The value of the Mitsubishi automobile, less
the outstanding obligation, was $7,200. See Addendum B. Thus, the Appellant's total
award of the marital estate was $11,590.
Also included in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law was the award of
marital property to the Appellee. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 12, 18) The
Appellee was awarded the marital home valued at $175,0001 and a three acre parcel of
land valued $60,0002. The Appellee was also awarded two sand rails, and accompanying
trailers, valued by the Appellee at $18,000. (Feb. R. 219) The Appellee was awarded a
boat valued at $15,500, and a motor home valued at $67,980 See Addendum B.
]

The appraised value of the home was indicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 and stipulated to by
the Appellee. See Addendum C. (Jan. R. 12-13)
2

The appraised value of the three acre parcel was indicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 and
stipulated to by the Appellee. See Addendum C. (Jan. R.12-13)
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The Appellee was also awarded all the property listed on Schedule A of Plaintiffs
Exhibit i. See addendum B. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18) Schedule A
was created by Roger Nuttle, accountant and expert witness. Mr. Nuttle created this
document with ini mation provided by the Appellant. (Jan. R. 15-16) The total value of
the marital assets listed on Schedule A was $646. The value of each item was estimated
by the Appellant, and was not contested by the Appellee.
The trial court also awarded the Appellee all the property listed on Schedule B of
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum B. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11, 18)
Schedule B was also created by Roger Nuttle with information provided by the Appellant.
(Jan. R. 16-17) Many of the values attached to the various assets listed on Schedule B
were based on the estimates of the Appellant. (Jan. R.16-17) Additional information
regarding some of the values attached to the assets listed on Schedule B were compiled
by Mr. Nuttle through the deposition testimony of the Appellee. (Jan. R.16-17) The
Appellee also testified at trial regarding many of the estimated property values indicted
on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 indicates a total value of $151,800 for the assets listed on
Schedule B. See Addendum B. Marshaling the testimonial evidence (in regards to the
value of the property listed on Schedule B) in an attempt to support the trial court's
division of the marital estate as not being grossly disproportionate, results in a total value
of $65,700 for the assets listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1. See Addendum D.
Appellee was also awarded the guns and rifles a ceramic kiln and a big screen TV
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as listed on Schedule C of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum A. (Findings of Facts
11,17-18) See Addendum B. The total value of these items as indicted on Schedule C is
$2,100 which was not contested by the Appellee. Marshaling the evidence in the most
favorable light to support the trial court's decision, the combined value of all the marital
assets awarded to the Appellee is $404,926.
In connection with the awarded property to the Appellee the trial judge ordered the
Appellee to sell the marital home, three acre parcel, and the two sand rails to pay off all
existing mortgages and liens on all marital property, taxes owed to the Internal Revenue
Service and any other referenced marital debt. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P.
11, 18) If the foregoing sales of those previously listed assets were not sufficient to pay
all of the above mentioned marital debt, the boat and the motor home were to be sold.
All remaining assets or property was awarded to the Appellee. See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P. 11-12, 18-19) The total measure of referenced family and business
debt, including all mortgages, liens and back taxes is $290,082. See Addendum E.
Subtracting the combined total family debt of $290,082 from the Appellee's total award
of $404,926 leaves the Appellee with a total award of $114,844. Comparing that to the
$11,590 awarded to the Appellant, the percentage of the marital estate awarded to the
Appellant is approximately 9% while the award to the Appellee is approximately 91%.
In Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), the Appellant was only awarded 10%
of the marital estate while the Appellee was awarded 90%. Id. at 872. In that case the
Utah Supreme Court indicted that when a marriage has failed it is the trial courts duty to
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consider various factors in order to arrange the best allocation of the property and
economic resources so the parties can resume there life in as happy and useful a manner
as possible. Id. The court went on to say that when the division of property is so
discordant with an equitable allocation that it will more likely lead to further difficulties
and distress a reappraisal of the division must be undertaken. Id. The Court went on to
conclude that the 90% to 10% split was far to disparate and required that the decree
division be modified. Id.
Like the facts in Read, the Appellee in this case has been awarded 91%, virtually
all, of the marital property which both parties used and enjoyed prior to their divorce.
The Appellant has effectively been left with no assets to show for her eighteen years of
work and economic input into the family concrete business. On the other hand, the
Appellee was awarded more then enough property to pay for the marital debts and
received all the work related equipment to further his new business ventures. The trial
court's decree is clearly in discordance with the notion of equitable division of marital
property. When a 50%-50% division among the parties is presumably the proper division
upon divorce, a 91% to 9% division of a marital is unjustifiable in almost any
circumstance. Certainly there are no such circumstances in this case.
Additionally, had the Appellants value estimates of marital property been used by
the trial court, (not an irrational conclusion considering the heavy reliance on the
Appellants exhibits and expert witnesses) the Appellee's marital award would be
increased by an additional $86,100 for a total of $491,026. See Addendum D. Leaving
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the Appellee a total award, after paying all marital debts, of $200,944, increasing the
margin of disparity between the awards of the Appellant and Appellee to 5Vi % of the
marital estate being awarded to the Appellant and 94lA % being awarded to the Appellee.
Therefore, the trial courts division of the marital estate in favor of the Appellee is
grossly disproportionate.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
PUNISHED THE APPELLANT BY AWARDING HER ONLY 9% OF THE
MARITAL ASSETS.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court Judge Dutson stated

'the Court will not reward the Petitioner [Appellant] for her deceptions in regards to
property she has sold, disposed of and lied about." See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact
P. 10) Judge Dutson also stated "[t]he Court will, to some degree, resolve the problems
with her deception on the property division and debt payment, in that it was in these areas
that she lied." Id. Subsequent to these statements, Judge Dutson went on and divided the
marital estate 91% in favor of the Appellee, leaving only 9% to the Appellant. See supra.
In Read, 594 P.2d at 872, the Appellant argued that he was only awarded 10% of
the marital assets because the trial court intentionally punished him for the break up of his
marriage. Id. The Utah Supreme Court stated "[a] trial court must consider many factors
in making a property settlement in a divorce proceeding, but the purpose of the settlement
should not be to impose punishment upon either party." Id. at 872. The Read Court went
on to indicate "there is no authority in our law for administering punitive measures in a
divorce judgment, and to do so would be improper
22

" Id.

In this case Judge Dutson clearly believed that the Appellant lied to the court
during her testimony at trail regarding the dissipation of marital assets, namely some
concrete forms and a backhoe tractor. (Jan. R. 244, Feb. R. 62) See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P. 10) Based on such a finding Judge Dutson could have used that
information to weight the credibility of the Appellant's evidence. However, Judge
Dutson could not use that evidence to divide the marital assets in a punitive manner. Id.
Judge Dutson made no findings as to how the Appellants perceived inaccurate
testimony affected any valuation of the marital estate. To the contrary, the only evidence
used to support Judge Dutson's assessment and division of the marital assets was
Appellant's exhibit at trial, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. See Addendum B. The only reasonable
conclusion for why he used this evidence is it was the most creditable evidence presented
at trail.
Judge Dutson's decision to punish the Appellant for her "deceptions
on the property division," by awarding the Appellee 91% of the marital assets, instead of
using it to weigh the credibility of her testimony, was an abuse of his authority. A trial
court judge has no authority to administer punitive measures in a divorce judgment.
Read, 594 P.2d at 872.
Therefore, Judge Dutson's punitive award of 9% of the marital assets to the
Appellant is improper.
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IV

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DID NOT ASSIGN
VALUES TO EACH ITEM OF DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY.
The trial court did not make adequate findings in the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. See Addendum A. In his findings the trial court distributes and
awards various martial assets almost exclusively based on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and,
impliedly on Plaintiffs Exhibit 10. See Addendums B and F. (Findings of Facts P. 1719) The values indicted on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 are largely uncontested, with the
exception of items listed on Schedule B of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 (hereinafter Schedule B).
The nature and value of the items identified on Schedule B were disputed between
Appellant and Appellee. See Addendum D. The parties estimates of the total value of
the marital assets listed on Schedule B differed by $86,100. See Addendum D.
The trial court's Findings of fact and conclusions of Law failed to identify whether
or not the values provided in Plaintiffs Exhibit lwere in fact the values as determined by
the trial court. Even more problematic is the lack of any trial court findings regarding
the value of the items listed on Schedule B. Assuming arguendo that Judge Dutson
intended to use all the values as provided by Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, The Appellee's marital
award of $404,926 (the figure used in Argument II after marshaling the evidence to
support the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) would be increased by an
additional $86,100 for a total of $491,026. Leaving the Appellee a total award, after
paying all marital debts, of $200,944, increasing the margin of disparity between the
awards of the Appellant and Appellee to 5]/2 % of the marital estate being awarded to the
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Appellant and 94lA % being awarded to the Appellee.
In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) the trial court faced a
situation where the value of the marital assets was sharply disputed. Id. at 955. "[I]n its
memorandum decision and findings of fact, the trial court did not: (a) identify the items
of marital property and debt; and (b) assign values to each item of marital property and
debt or a total value to the cumulative share awarded to each party." Id. This Court went
on to conclude "we cannot perform our reviewing function and determine whether the
parties' property was equitably distributed without the trial court's detailed identification
and valuation of the assets and debts awarded to each party." Id.
Like the facts in Stevens, the trial court failed to provided a detailed valuation of
the assets listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See Addendum A (Findings of Fact P. 17-19)
As such, it is impossible to determine how much of the marital estate the Appellant and
Appellee actually received. Value determinations are required for an equitable division
of properly. Id.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the judgement as to the property division,
remand for further factual findings and require the trial court to equtiably divide the
marital assets.
V

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DID NOT AWARD THE APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FEES AND COURT
COSTS.
In the trial courts Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it concluded that each

party waw responsible for it's own attorneys fees and costs. See Addendum A.
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(Findings of Facts P. 13). Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(1) (2001) codifies a trial court's
discretion to award attorneys fees, costs and expert witness fees in divorce actions to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend an action. Codification of such discretion to
award fees was intended to allow divorce litigants a broader award of reimbursement than
those authorized in other civil cases. Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App.
1991). A trial courts broad discretion to award attorneys fees "must be based on evidence
of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App.
1998). The Appellant and Appellee's circumstances fit the criteria for awarding attorneys
fees and costs to the Appellant.
A.

The Appellant Has Substantial Financial Need to Justify Awarding
Attorneys Fees and Costs,

In the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the court found the
Appellant's monthly income to be $1,316 dollars per month. See Addendum A.
(Findings of Fact P. 6) Compounding the Appellants financial need, the trial court only
awarded the Appellant 9% if all the marital assets. The Appellant did received some
furniture, and her vehicle with its accompanying debt, but these assets are clearly
inadequate to aid the Appellant and her financial need and could not be used to offset the
cost of litigation. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 11)
The Appellant also incurred substantial costs in hiring an accountant to compile
the financial documentation used to support the trial courts findings. Without this
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information the trial court would not have been able to determine the Appellee's income
or to establish alimony or child support. The Appellee did not aid the trial court
whatsoever in producing information for the trial court to rely on.
Furthermore, the trial court did not make any findings as to what it based it's
decision on in not awarding attorneys fees and costs. Given the facts that the Appellant
had no significant income, received no substantial assets in the property division, and the
trial court made no findings as to why it did not award any attorney's fees or costs,
suggests the courts intentions to further punish the Appellant for her "deceptions." It is
clear that the Appellant's financial need justifies an award of attorneys fees.
B.

The Appellee Has Substantial Assets to Pay for Appellants Attorneys
Fees and Costs,

During the course of litigation, the Appellee was uncooperative in supplying his
financial records. The Appellee did not produce any significant evidence through
testimony, or any other means, to aid the court in it's valuation of income. Additionally,
the Appellee attempted to hide assets by selling his business to his live-in girlfriend.
(Jan. R. 194-97)
Through the efforts of Appellant's counsel and accountant, the trial court was able
to determined the Appellee's annual income of $70,000-$75,000 per year or
approximately $6,000 per month. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 7) In addition
to the Appellee's substantial income, the Appellee was awarded approximately $114,000
worth of assets in the property division. See Supra. It is clear that the Appellee has the
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ability to pay for the Appellants attorney's fees and costs.
C.

The Trial Court Failed to Make Any Determination on the
Reasonableness of Attorneys Fees and Costs,

During the first day of trial Appellant offered Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, which
consisted of an itemized list of attorneys fees. The exhibit was accepted by the trial court
without objection. (Jan. R. 174-75) During the second day of trial counsel for the
Appellant requested an opportunity to proffer regarding attorneys fees. (Feb. R. 257) The
trial court rejected counsels request and indicted that the court would accept affidavits on
attorneys fees. (Feb. R. 257) Subsequent to Judge Dutson's oral obligation to accept
affidavits regarding attorneys fees and costs, the trial court summarily denied counsel the
opportunity to submit an affidavit regarding attorneys fees and costs when it denied
attorneys fees and costs in it's written decision and in it's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 13)
The trial court's denial of attorneys fees and costs was not supported by any
findings. Specifically, there was no basis or any reason given as to whether or not the
submitted fees were reasonable nor did the trial court address any of the required
elements regarding the awarding of attorneys fees and costs. Based on these facts, the
trial court was obligated to make a findings in support of it's decision to not award
attorneys fees and costs.
D.

The Appellant should be awarded attorneys fees because she prevailed
on the issues of child custody, child support and alimony.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2)(2001) codifies a trial courts discretion to award
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attorneys fees and costs in divorce actions upon a determination that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. If a party substantially prevails or
defends, the trial court, upon its discretion, may award fees, limited fees, or no fees upon
a finding that the party is impecunious, or enters in the record the reasons for not
awarding fees.
Appellant was awarded custody of the parties two minor children. See Addendum
A. (Findings of Fact P. 2) Appellant was awarded child support of $487.08 for each of
the two minor children. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 2) Appellant was
awarded $1,200 per month in Alimony. See Addendum A. (Findings of Fact P. 13)
Based on these facts, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) mandates that the trial court make
specific findings as to whether or not it is awarding attorneys fees and costs, and on what
basis it is making it's decision. The trial court made no such findings.
Based on thefindingsthat the Appellee's annual income ia approximately $6,000
a month it is unlikely that the trial court could then characterize Appellee as impecunious.
As such, the trial court is required to make specificfindingssupporting it's decision to
not award attorney's fees. The trial court made no such findings. Rather, the trial court
summarily denied the Appellant any award of attorneys fees and costs. See Addendum
A. (Findings of Fact P. 13)
Therefore, this Court should remand the issue of attorneys fees and costs back to
the trial court, and require the trial court to make further findings as to the awarding of
attorneys fees.
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Conclusion
The trial court inappropriately set aside the on the record settlement agreement between
the parties. The Appellant offered the exact terms of the agreement while on the record
before the court. The Appellant made it clear that the offer was an unconditioned 'take it
or leave it offer," and both parties assented to the settlement agreement.
Therefore, this court should reverse the trial courts decision to set aside the
agreement, and find the settlement agreement binding.
The trial court division of the marital assets in a 91%- 9% split of the marital
assets in favor of the Appellee is grossly disproportionate and constitutes an abuse of
discretion. In this case, it is also clearly intended to be punitive.
Therefore, this Court should enter its own ruling based on upon the evidence
presented at trial. Alternatively, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court,
and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions requiring the trial court to not be
punitive in it's division of the marital assets, and to make an equitable distribution of the
assets supported by sufficient findings.
The trial court inappropriately did not award the Appellant attorneys fees and
costs. The Appellant was in substantial financial need, and the Appellee was in a
financial position to pay for the Appellant's fees.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial courts decision not awarding
attorneys fees and costs, and remand the issue back to the trial court with instruction to
consider the relevant position of the parties, and to support its decision with sufficient
30

findings.
DATED this^o^J? Day of My, 2002.
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